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INTRODUCTION 
Ownership structure is one of the main dimensions of corporate governance and is widely 
seen to be determined by other country-level corporate governance characteristics such as the 
development of the stock market and the nature of state intervention and regulation (La Porta, 
López-de-Silanes, Shleifer and Vishny, 1998). Shareholder structures are quite diverse across 
countries, with dispersed ownership being much more frequent in US and UK listed firms, 
compared to Continental Europe, where controlled ownership is prevalent (La Porta, López-
de-Silanes, Shleifer and Vishny, 1999). Faccio and Lang (2002) report in a study of 5232 
publicly traded corporations in 13 Western European countries that only 36.93 % were widely 
held firms. In addition, cross-country studies of La Porta et al. (1999) point out that 
ownership of large companies in rich economies is typically concentrated; that control is often 
exercised through pyramidal groups with a holding company at the top controlling one or 
more subsidiaries; and that the controlling shareholders are often actively involved in 
company management and sit on the board of directors. Although some companies in the 
United States are controlled by large shareholders, e.g. Microsoft, Ford, and Wal-Mart, such 
firms are relatively few and have thus drawn less attention in the corporate governance debate 
(Anderson and Reeb, 2003). The differences in ownership structure have two obvious 
consequences for corporate governance, as surveyed in Morck, Wolfenzon, and Yeung 
(2005). On the one hand, dominant shareholders have both the incentive and the power to 
discipline management. On the other hand, concentrated ownership can create conditions for a 
new problem, because the interests of controlling and minority shareholders are not aligned. 
We refer to Enrique and Volpin (2007) for a detailed description of the differences in the 
ownership structure of companies in the main economies of continental Europe with 
comparisons to the United States and the United Kingdom. 
 
Corporate governance concerns “the structure of rights and responsibilities among the parties 
with a stake in the firm” (Aoki, 2001). Yet the diversity of practices around the world nearly 
defies a common definition (Aguilera and Jackson, 2003). In most comparisons, researchers 
contrast two dichotomous models of Anglo-American and Continental European corporate 
governance (Becht and Roël, 1999; Hall and Soskice, 2001; La Porta et al., 1998). For 
example, the United Kingdom and United States are characterized by dispersed ownership 
where markets for corporate control, legal regulation, and contractual incentives are key 
governance mechanisms. In continental Europe and Japan, large shareholders such as banks 3 
 
and families retain greater capacity to exercise direct control and, thus, operate in a context 
with fewer market-oriented rules for disclosure, weaker managerial incentives, and greater 
supply of debt. The predominant role of corporate governance reflected in the accounting and 
finance literature is the agency view (Fama and Jensen, 1983; Baysinger and Hoskisson, 
1990; Bathala and Rao, 1995). While shareholders are concerned about maximizing returns at 
reasonable risk, managers may prefer growth to profits (empire building may bring prestige or 
higher salaries), may be lazy or fraudulent (“shirk”), and may maintain costly labor or product 
standards above the necessary competitive minimum. Given the potential separation of 
ownership and control (Berle and Means, 1932), various mechanisms are needed to align the 
interests of principals and agents (Fama, 1980; Fama and Jensen, 1983; Jensen and Meckling, 
1976). Agency costs arise because shareholders face problems in monitoring management: 
they have imperfect information to make qualified decisions; contractual limits to 
management discretion may be difficult to enforce. To reduce these costs, various contractual 
mechanisms, including corporate boards, are designed to align the interests of the 
management with those of the stockholders (Shleifer and Vishny, 1997; Klein, 1998). Hence, 
monitoring the actions and decisions of management is the primary focus of the board from an 
agency perspective.  
 
Boards are by definition the internal governing mechanism that shapes firm governance, given 
their direct access to the two other axes in the corporate governance triangle: managers and 
shareholders (owners). Fama (1980) argues that the composition of board structure is an 
important mechanism because the presence of non-executive directors represents a means of 
monitoring the actions of the executive directors and of ensuring that the executive directors 
are pursuing policies consistent with shareholders' interests. Furthermore, boards of directors 
are one of the centerpieces of corporate governance reform. In effect, the board of directors 
has emerged as both a target of blame for corporate misdeeds and as the source capable of 
improving corporate governance. Much of the weight in solving the excess power within 
corporations has been assigned to the board of directors and, specifically, to the need for non-
executive directors to increase executive accountability. There are strong perceptions that 
independent directors lead to increased good governance (Fernández-Rodríguez, Gómez-
Ansón and Cuervo-García, 2004). The high expectations of the role of the non-executive 
board members are interesting since the existing empirical studies show mixed results 
regarding the relationship between firm performance and board independence (e.g. Dalton, 4 
 
Daily, Ellstrand and Johnson, 1998; Dulewicz and Herbert, 2004; Peng, 2004; Weisbach and 
Hermalin, 2003). In fact, some scholars argue that a supermajority of independent directors 
will lead to worse performance (Bhagat and Black, 1999). Furthermore, Hillman, Cannella 
and Paetzold (2000) discuss how in governance research there is a need to look at skills 
distinct from monitoring. They posit it is also important to have board members with varied 
skills such as being insiders in the firm, business experts, support specialists (e.g., experts on 
law or public relations) and community influentials (e.g., members of a community 
organization). The resource dependence perspective (Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978; Boyd, 1990) 
presents an alternative to the agency perspective, arguing that good governance is achieved 
when board members are appointed for their expertise to help firms successfully cope with 
environmental uncertainty. 
 
Much of the policy prescriptions enshrined in codes of good corporate governance rely on 
universal notions of best practice, which often need to be adapted to the local contexts of 
firms or translated across diverse national institutional settings (Aguilera and Cuervo-Cazurra, 
2004; Fiss and Zajac, 2004; Ahmadjian and Robbins, 2005). An important questions 
addressed in this paper is whether all firms, regardless of their ownership pattern, should be 
submitted to the ‘one-rule-fits-all’ principle of majority non-executive directors and a 
separation of CEO and chairman. In this context, Aguilera (2005) and Millar, Eldomiaty, Choi 
and Hilton (2005) argue that national institutions such as the ownership structure, the 
enforceability of corporate regulations or culture tend to enable as well as constrain diverse 
corporate governance mechanisms and that a better understanding of the role of boards of 
directors in different institutional settings is needed before engaging in the debate of how to 
increase board accountability. Moreover, by providing a framework for analyzing how firms 
can address differences between the interests of principals (e.g., shareholders/board of 
directors) and agents (top managers), valuable contribution are made in assessing the efficient 
structure of corporate governance (Beatty and Zajac, 1994).  
 
DUAL ROLE OF THE BOARD OF DIRECTORS 
Zahra and Pearce (1989) and Hillman and Dalziel (2003) describe the two main functions of 
the Board of Directors as monitoring and providing resources. The theoretical underpinning of 
the board’s monitoring function is derived from agency theory, which describes the potential 
for conflicts of interest that arise from the separation of ownership and control in 5 
 
organizations (Berle and Means, 1932; Fama and Jensen, 1983). Agency theorists see the 
primary function of boards as monitoring the actions of “agents”- managers - to protect the 
interests of “principals” -owners (Eisenhardt, 1989; Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Mizruchi, 
1983). Monitoring by the board is important because of the potential costs incurred when 
management pursues its own interests at the expense of shareholders’ interests. Monitoring by 
boards of directors can reduce agency costs inherent in the separation of ownership and 
control and, in this way, improve firm performance (Fama, 1980; Mizruchi, 1983; Zahra and 
Pearce, 1989). 
 
Researchers studying the monitoring function have coalesced in their general preference for 
boards dominated by independent outside directors (Barnhart, Marr and Rosenstein, 1994; 
Baysinger and Butler, 1985; Daily, 1995; Daily and Dalton, 1994a,b; Weisbach, 1988). They 
argue that boards consisting primarily of insiders (current or former managers/employees of 
the firm) or those outsiders who are not independent of current management or the firm 
(because of business dealings, family/social relationships) have less incentive to monitor 
management, owing to their dependence on the CEO/organization. Boards dominated by 
outside, nonaffiliated directors, however, are thought to be better monitors because they lack 
this disincentive to monitor. Despite numerous empirical tests, however, this hypothesis has 
yet to be unequivocally supported. Two recent meta-analyses of existing studies found no 
statistical support for a relationship between board incentives (e.g., board dependence or 
equity compensation) to monitor and firm performance (Dalton, Daily, Certo and Roengpitya, 
2003; Dalton et al., 1998).  
 
The second, relatively less explored, path researchers take to study boards and firm 
performance relies on the provision of resources (e.g., legitimacy, advice and counsel, links to 
other organizations, etc.) by the board of directors. The theoretical underpinning of this 
approach is based on Pfeffer and Salancik’s (1978) work on resource dependency. This 
perspective is adopted by scholars in the resource dependence (Boyd, 1990; Daily and Dalton, 
1994a,b; Gales and Kesner, 1994; Hillman et al., 2000; Pfeffer, 1972; Pfeffer and Salancik, 
1978) and stakeholder traditions (Hillman, Keim and Luce, 2001; Johnson and Greening, 
1999; Luoma and Goodstein, 1999). Resources help reduce dependency between the 
organization and external contingencies (Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978), diminish uncertainty for 
the firm (Pfeffer, 1972), lower transaction costs (Williamson, 1984) and ultimately aid in the 6 
 
survival of the firm (Singh, House and Tucker, 1986). Empirical studies in the resource 
dependence tradition have shown a relationship between board capital and firm performance 
(e.g., Boyd, 1990; Dalton, Daily, Johnson and Ellstrand, 1999; Pfeffer, 1972). Carpenter and 
Westphal (2001) found that boards consisting of directors with ties to strategically related 
organizations, for example, were able to provide better advice and counsel, which is 
positively related to firm performance (Westphal, 1999). In addition, Hillman, Zardkoohi and 
Bierman (1999) found that when directors established connections to the U.S. government, 
shareholder value was positively affected. They concluded that such connections held the 
promise for information flow, more open communication and/or potential influence with the 
government, a critical source of uncertainty for many firms. Researchers have also found that 
interlocking directorates can play an important role in disseminating information across firms 
(Burt, 1980; Palmer, 1983; Useem, 1984), in reducing vertical coordination and scanning 
costs (Bazerman and Schoorman, 1983), and in serving as a mechanism for the diffusion of 
innovation (Haunschild and Beckman, 1998). Executive directors’ external ties also facilitate 
access to strategic information and opportunities (Pfeffer, 1991), enhance environmental 
scanning (Useem, 1984) and reveal information about the agendas and operations of other 
firms (Burt, 1983). Empirical evidence has shown that executives’ external ties play a critical 
role in future strategy formulation and subsequent firm performance (Eisenhardt and 
Schoonhoven, 1996; Geletkanycz and Hambrick, 1997). Rosenstein and Wyatt (1994) have 
further shown, using event-study methodology, that shareholder value of a firm improves 
when the company’s CEO is asked to join the board of another firm. 
 
In practice, boards both monitor and provide resources (Korn/Ferry, 1999), and, theoretically, 
both are related to firm performance. A recent large scale archival study conducted by 
Larcker, Richardson and Tuna (2004) concluded that the traditional monitoring perspective of 
measuring governance is of limited value in explaining the behavior of managers as well as 
the performance of firms. Further, Cohen, Krishnamoorthy and Wright (2004) argue that a 
narrow view of corporate governance restricting it to only monitoring activities may 
potentially undervalue the role that corporate governance can play. However, the priorities of 
the board of directors are not independent from the context in which the company operates. 
Randøy and Jenssen (2004) argue that firms in highly competitive industries will already be 
‘monitored’ by the market and, therefore, they should have fewer outside board members. In 
effect, they find a negative relationship between board independence and firm performance in 7 
 
industries with highly competitive product markets among publicly traded Swedish firms and 
attributed the detrimental effect on the predominance of the director’s resource function over 
the monitoring function. Furthermore, previous literature indicates that agency problems that 
need to be addressed depend on the ownership structure. The monitoring role of outside 
directors is most important when ownership is diffuse: when ownership is concentrated, the 
large shareholder(s) can effectively influence and monitor the management, sometimes by 
personally sitting on the board. Shleifer and Vishny (1986) argue that large shareholders have 
a strong incentive to monitor managers because of their significant economic stakes. Even 
when they cannot monitor the management themselves, large shareholders can facilitate third-
party takeovers by splitting the large gains on their own shares with the bidder. In a 
corporation with many small owners, however, it may not pay any one of them to monitor the 
performance of the management individually.  
 
The demand for monitoring is expected to be influenced by the distribution of power amongst 
the stakeholders and their individual incentives. The agency literature suggests that some 
control mechanisms may be substitutable so that there could be a trade-off among various 
sources of control available to individual stakeholders (Jensen and Meckling, 1976). 
Considering two essential dimensions of the ownership structure, concentration and 
managerial ownership, we describe the main corporate governance problems and main role of 
the board of directors (table 1). 
 
‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐ 
Insert Table 1 about here 
‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐ 
 
1) Dispersed ownership – none or low managerial ownership 
In firms with dispersed ownership the main agency conflict to be addressed is the conflict 
between hired managers who are unaccountable to outsiders and dispersed shareholders due 
to the separation of ownership and control (Jensen and Meckling, 1976). The dispersed 
ownership structures of large companies could potentially generate free rider problems insofar 
as they hinder direct managerial supervision by shareholders (Grossman and Hart, 1980). 
Shareholders in firms with dispersed ownership prefer strategies of exit rather than voice to 8 
 
monitor management (Eisenhardt, 1989). While small shareholders do not have incentive to 
monitor individually, collectively all shareholders benefit from the monitoring efforts by the 
board of directors. Therefore, the function of the board of directors is likely to focus on 
monitoring management to reduce the agency problems between management and dispersed 
shareholders. 
 
2) Dispersed ownership – some managerial ownership 
Managerial stock ownership contributes to reducing agency costs (Jensen and Meckling, 
1976). When a company’s managers hold a substantial number of the shares of that company, 
there is an alignment of interests between the managers and the rest of the shareholders. 
Managers benefit directly from their own professional efforts and suffer the negative 
consequences of their opportunistic actions through the respective positive and negative 
variations of the market value of their shares. The board of directors remains the main 
instrument of monitoring of shareholders but the agency problem may be less severe when 
managers hold relative important shareholder positions. 
 
3) Controlled ownership – none or low managerial ownership 
Shleifer and Vishny (1986) argue that large shareholders have a strong incentive to monitor 
managers because of their significant economic stakes. Furthermore, large shareholder 
typically has some ability to influence proxy voting and may also receive special attention 
from management (Useem, 1996). Moreover, Heflin and Shaw (2000) argue that monitoring 
by large shareholders might give them access to ‘private, value-relevant information. These 
shareholders can also engage with management in setting corporate policy (Bhagat, Black and 
Blair, 2004). Fernández Méndez and Arrondo García (2007) find evidence of a negative effect 
of large shareholders on audit committee activity, possibly as a result of substitution between 
alternative control mechanisms or because of large shareholder exploitation of private benefits 
of control. Furthermore, large shareholders are in the position to facilitate third-party 
takeovers by splitting the large gains on their own shares with the bidder (shleifer and Vishny, 
1986). For firms with controlling shareholders, however, separation of ownership and control 
generates a two-level agency problem: between controlling shareholders and management and 
between minority shareholders and controlling shareholders. The problem between 
controlling shareholders and minority shareholders will be less severe if management is 
independent from the controlling shareholders. 9 
 
 
The board of directors reflects to a high degree the shareholder structure of the company. 
Large shareholders are typically directly or indirectly represented on the board of directors. 
Prioritizing the monitoring activity, over the provision of resources, of the board of directors 
benefits mostly minority shareholders, while large shareholders already dedicate individual 
efforts to monitoring and have access to superior information, management interaction and 
alternative governance mechanisms to discipline management. Furthermore, minority 
shareholders have less influence on the board composition compared to large shareholders. 
Therefore, the priorities of the board may be directed towards the provision of resources 
rather than adding an additional layer of monitoring. 
 
4) Controlled ownership – some managerial ownership 
When the controlling shareholders are also actively involved in the management of the 
company, the agency problem related to the dispersion of ownership and control is dissolved. 
However, another agency problem, that between minority shareholders and controlling 
shareholders, may arise. A recent example of this problem was presented by the Parmalat 
scandal, where the controlling shareholder and CEO, Calisto Tanzi diverted about $800m 
shareholder’s wealth towards family controlled businesses. Family firms are typically 
characterized by large controlling owners who are actively involved in management and have 
recently received a lot of attention from research. As mentioned before, the board of directors 
typically reflects at least partially the ownership structure. Therefore, a board where the 
controlling family has an overwhelming influence on the board of directors and control the 
information provided to its members is less likely to provide good monitoring. Empirical 
studies however show that these firms do not underperform. 
 
Previous studies suggest that family owners may have superior monitoring abilities relative to 
diffused shareholders, especially when family ownership is combined with family control 
over management and the board (Anderson and Reeb, 2004). Because current generation 
owners have the tendency and obligation to preserve wealth for the next generation, family 
firms often have longer time horizons compared to nonfamily firms. Moreover, the 
controlling family is likely to commit more human capital to the firm and to care more about 
its long-run value (Bertrand and Schoar, 2006). Family members therefore represent a special 10 
 
class of large shareholders that may have a unique incentive structure, a strong voice in the 
firm and powerful motivation to make longer term strategic decisions (Becht and Roel, 1999; 
Dhnadirek and Tang, 2003). The monitoring happens however largely beyond the board of 
directors. Jensen and Meckling’s (1976) agency model asserts that family firms have so little 
managerial opportunism within their organizational structure that the need for internal 
governance mechanisms, like a board of directors, is negated. Recent theory suggests, 
however, that boards serve more than a governance function (e.g., Hillman and Dalziel, 2003; 
Johnson, Daily and Ellstrand, 1996). In this more recent tradition, we perceive the board of 
directors as a resource used by family firm owners to assist family executives (less so than to 
monitor them). 
 
Recent studies confirm that, on average, family-controlled firms are better managed than 
widely held ones. In a sample of large U.S. companies, Anderson and Reeb (2003) find a 
significantly higher Tobin’s q for family-controlled firms (a third of their sample) than for 
widely held companies. Barontini and Caprio (2005) find a similar result for European 
companies. Tobin’s q is the ratio of the market value of a firm to the replacement value of its 
assets, typically measured as the book value of the firm’s assets. A higher (industry-adjusted) 
Tobin’s q suggests that the assets are used efficiently—that is, they are worth more within the 
firm than in alternative uses. 
 
However, families, like managers in a widely held company, can abuse their power and use 
corporate resources to their own advantage. When this happens in a family-controlled firm, 
things are even worse than in a widely held company, because controlling families cannot be 
ousted through a hostile takeover or replaced by the board of directors or by the shareholders’ 
meeting (Enrique and Volpin, 2007). Research on deterrence of expropriation mainly focuses 
mainly on the presence of other large institutional shareholders or institutional regulation to 
control such behavior, rather than focusing on the composition of the board of directors. 
 
OWNERSHIP STRUCTURE AND BOARD COMPOSITION: SETTING PRIORITIES  
Agency theory explains how agency problems depend on the ownership structure: on the one 
hand, firms with dispersed ownership face agency problems between management and 
dispersed shareholders, as described by Berle and Means (1932). Shareholders with a little 11 
 
stake in the firm has weak incentives to engage in monitoring of managers since all the costs 
of monitoring are incurred while only a small fraction of the benefits are gained (the typical 
free rider problem). To resolve the alignment problem in firms with dispersed ownership, the 
board primary focuses on monitoring. On the other hand, firms with large controlling owners 
largely solve the management-shareholders agency problem. The composition and role of the 
board of directors can be influenced by large shareholders in the general shareholders 
meeting. Rather than using the board to add an additional layer of monitoring, a role as 
providing resource to management maybe much more useful to improve firm performance.  
Hillman and Dalziel (2003) argue that both ability and incentives of stakeholders are likely to 
affect behavior within organizations, suggesting that examining one without the other is 
insufficient. 
‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐ 
Insert Figure 1 about here 
‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐ 
From the previous discussion it is clear that the ownership structure may influence the 
composition and role of the board of directors, as shown in figure 1. Shareholders in firms 
with dispersed ownership have, collectively, a great need to use the board of directors to 
monitor the managers, while large shareholders in firms with concentrated ownership are 
individually motivated to monitor management, have a lot of influence beyond the board, 
access to valuable information and alternative corporate governance mechanisms to disciple 
the managers if necessary. Furthermore, if the controlling owners are also actively involved in 
the management of the company, the need to monitor by the controlling shareholder 
disappears. Fernández Méndez and Arrondo García (2007) provide empirical evidence in this 
context. They find a lower audit committee’s activity in highly leveraged firms and when the 
ownership structure is concentrated in the hands of large shareholders. 
 
Proposition 1a: The board of directors in companies with dispersed ownership focuses 
primarily on monitoring  
Proposition 1b: The board of directors in companies with concentrated ownership focuses 
primarily on providing resources  
 12 
 
THE CHARACTERISTICS OF OUTSIDE DIRECTORS 
Boards are by definition the internal governing mechanism that shapes firm governance, given 
their direct access to the two other axes in the corporate governance triangle: managers and 
shareholders (owners). Furthermore, the board of directors has emerged as both a target of 
blame for corporate misdeeds and as the source capable of improving corporate governance. 
Much of the weight in solving the excess (generally executive) power within corporations has 
been assigned to the board of directors and, specifically, to the need for non-executive 
directors to increase executive accountability.  
Agency theorists argue that the composition of board structure is an important mechanism 
because the presence of non-executive directors represents a means of monitoring the actions 
of the executive directors and of ensuring that the executive directors are pursuing policies 
consistent with shareholders' interests (Fama, 1980). However, from a resource provision 
point of view outsider can bring in important knowledge, including providing 
legitimacy/bolstering the public image of the firm, providing expertise, administering advice 
and counsel, linking the firm to important stakeholders or other important entities, facilitating 
access to resources such as capital, building external relations, diffusing innovation and aiding 
in the formulation of strategy or other important firm decisions. Therefore, from both 
perspectives bringing outsiders to the board may improve firm performance. However the 
desired characteristics of the outside board members are different for a board focusing on 
monitoring compared to a board focusing on providing resources. For the first, financial 
expertise may be the most important element, while knowledge of the industry, competitors, 
law or other relevant resources may be more important for the latter. 
The many empirical studies that have examined the impact of the insider-outsider ratio on 
boards have found no consistent evidence to suggest that increasing the percentage of 
outsiders on the board will enhance performance. If anything, they suggest that pushing too 
far to remove inside and affiliated directors may harm firm performance by depriving boards 
of the valuable firm and industry-specific knowledge they provide (Fama and Jensen, 1983; 
Baysinger and Hoskisson, 1990). A few studies identified a positive relationship between the 
percentage of outside directors and firm performance (Schellenger, Wood and Tashakori, 
1989; Pearce and Zahra, 1992; Daily and Dalton, 1993), while other studies found no 
significant relationship between board composition and company performance (Mallette and 13 
 
Fowler, 1992; Daily and Johnson, 1997; Bhagat and Black, 1999; Hermalin and Weisbach, 
1991; Klein, 1998; Dulewicz and Herbert, 2004).  
 
Trying to explain these conflicting findings, Dalton et al. (1998) and Wagner, Stimpert and 
Fubara (1998) conducted meta-analyses of the research on board composition and 
performance. Dalton et al.’s (1998) analysis of 54 studies found no evidence of a link between 
insider-outsider ratio and company financial performance and showed that neither the size of 
the company nor the measures used for director type or company performance, affected the 
findings. Wagner et al. (1998) analyzed 29 studies and found similar results, with their meta-
analysis indicating that increasing the number of insiders or outsiders had a positive effect on 
performance, suggesting that board size may be more important than composition. They also 
found some evidence of a U-shaped relationship between the insider-outsider ratio and 
performance, as boards with a very high or low percentage of insiders performed better than 
those with a more even mix of insiders and outsiders. In contrast, Barnhart et al. (1994) and 
Barnhart and Rosenstein (1998) found evidence of a reverse, curvilinear relationship between 
the percentage of independent directors, as classified by Institutional Shareholder Services 
(ISS), and some performance measures. They reported that firms where boards have a clear 
majority of independent directors or very few independent directors had lower stock market 
performance. 
 
Recently, Peng (2004) analyzed a sample of China’s largest public companies and found that 
increasing the percentage of independent directors had no impact on either ROE or sales 
growth, but that adding more affiliated, outside directors, was linked to higher subsequent 
sales growth (but not ROE). He attributes this result to the role these directors play in securing 
resources for the firm as part of Chinese business networks.  
 
The desired characteristics of the outside board members may depend on the priorities set by 
the board of directors. Boards primarily focusing on monitoring can benefit strongly from 
outside board members who have expertise at understanding financial reports, while boards 
focusing on providing resources may benefit from having politicians or lawyers on their 
boards. Additionally, corporate governance codes have strongly focused on board 
independence as key element of good governance. It is a priori not clear whether boards 14 
 
focusing on resource provision would have a smaller ratio of insiders/outsiders on the board, 
as they have a clear interest in bringing outsiders to the board as well. 
 
Proposition 2a: There is a positive relationship between the proportion of board members 
with financial monitoring expertise and firm performance when the board focuses on 
monitoring. 
Proposition 2b: There is a positive relationship between the proportion of board members 




Board composition is a fundamental characteristic that affects the board’s capacity to control 
managerial actions (Fama and Jensen, 1983). A manager-dominated board has severe 
limitations as far as controlling managerial actions contrary to shareholders’ interests is 
concerned. Consequently, a manager-dominated board would not be an effective way to 
control managers’ opportunistic actions. The reason is that when the CEO is also the chairman 
of the board, the power within the firm is concentrated in one person’s hands. This allows the 
CEO to control information available to other board members. The board becomes under the 
control of managers, which prevents it from effectively accomplishing its tasks of hiring, 
eventually firing, and rewarding top executive officers, and to ratify and monitor important 
decisions. Given the decrease in the effectiveness of the board the potential agency costs 
resulting from the separation of ownership and decision making are exacerbated. Jensen 
(1993) recommends that companies separate the titles of CEO and board chairman. 
Furthermore, dominance of a board by insiders could hinder the formation of active, 
independent audit committees (Klein, 2002). 
 
The results of research on the effects of duality on company performance are ambiguous 
(Finegold, Benson and Hecht, 2007). Most studies using stock market measures have found 
no significant effects (Daily and Dalton, 1992, 1997; Rechner and Dalton, 1989; Baliga et al., 
1996; Brickley et al., 1997). Studies that have looked at financial measures have shown mixed 
results with some indicating that duality enhanced performance (Daily and Dalton, 1994; 15 
 
Donaldson and Davis, 1991; Kiel and Nicholson, 2003), while others (Coles, McWilliams and 
Sen, 2001; Rechner and Dalton, 1991) showed negative impact. 
 
Finkelstein and D’Aveni (1994) present a contingency model which suggests independent 
board structure is beneficial when the firm has been experiencing strong financial 
performance, and there is increased potential for entrenchment. Rhoades, Rechner and 
Sundaramurthy (2001) found empirical support using a meta-analysis of 22 duality studies. 
Furthermore, Boyd (1995) found that in industries that were resource-constrained or higher in 
complexity having one person fill both roles was positively related to return on investment 
(ROI), while overall duality was not significantly related to ROI. A study of Chinese 
companies (Peng, 2004) making the difficult transition from state-owned enterprises to 
publicly-traded joint stock companies also found that firms with a unified chair-CEO had 
higher sales growth (but not ROE).  
 
From an agency perspective, a duality of the chairman may substantially weaken the board’s 
monitoring effectiveness. However from a resource provision perspective, a duality may be 
beneficial. If the board of directors is designed to assist management, the presence of CEO on 
the board will be beneficial. Not only will its presence improve the information flow towards 
the board members, but the interaction and discussion of the CEO with board members may 
lead to more valuable advice and better firm performance. Furthermore, the problem of 
duality may be far less relevant when large shareholders provide counterbalance. An 
underperforming CEO, even if chairman, may face more initiative to substitute him by board 
members representing large shareholders than board members representing minority 
shareholders. 
 
Proposition 3a: There is a negative relationship between the duality and firm performance 
when the board focuses on monitoring. 
Proposition 3a: There is a positive relationship between the duality and firm performance 





BOARD OF DIRECTOR’S OPTIMAL SIZE 
Previous literature has studied the relationship between the number of directors sitting on the 
board and firm performance. Different and opposing theoretical arguments are presented in 
the literature to support either large or small board size. Large board size is argued to benefit 
corporate performance as a result of enhancing the ability of the firm to establish external 
links with the environment, securing more rare resources and bringing more exceptional 
qualified counsel (Dalton et al., 1999). In other words, “the greater the need for effective 
external linkage, the larger the board should be” (Pfeffer and Salancik 1978: 172). 
Furthermore, large board size may improve the efficiency of decision making process as a 
result of information sharing (Lehn, Sukesh and Zhao, 2003). On the other hand, Jensen 
(1993) states that keeping boards small can help improve their performance. When boards get 
beyond seven or eight people they are less likely to function effectively and are easier for the 
CEO to control. This leans on the idea that communication, coordination of tasks and decision 
making effectiveness among a large group of people is harder and costlier than it is in smaller 
groups. The costs overwhelm the advantages gained from having more people to draw on.  
 
There has been relatively little empirical research directly focused on the impact of board size 
on performance that could help determine the validity of these two perspectives. Yermack 
(1996), Bohren and Odegarrd (2001) and Postma, Van Ees and Sterken (2003) found firms 
with smaller boards have a better performance.  Other authors offered supportive evidence for 
the positive influence of large board size (Dalton et al., 1999; Kiel and Nicholson, 2003; 
Bozec and Dia, 2007; Belkhir, 2009). Moreover, other scholars have revealed no relationship 
between board size and corporate performance (Kaymark and Bekats, 2008). Finally, 
Eisenberg, Sundgren and Wells (1998) showed companies with smaller boards had higher 
ROA for 879 Finnish firms, arguing that the impact of board size may in part be contingent on 
the size and health of the firm. 
 
Dalton  et al. (1999) conducted a meta-analysis of 27 studies that featured a board size 
variable and found having more directors was associated with higher levels of firm financial 
performance. This result held true for firms of all sizes, but the effect of board size on 
performance was greater for smaller firms.  In contrast, De Andres, Azofra and Lopez (2005) 
analyzed ten developed markets, including the United States, and found a negative 
relationship between board size and firm performance as measured by 12-month equity 17 
 
market-to-book value, although the convex patterns of results suggested negative impact 
decreased as board sizes were larger.  
 
Considering the different a board can set, it is not clear whether the board size of boards 
focusing on monitoring would have exactly the same optima size as boards focusing on 
providing resources. Especially the incentives and ability of controlling a board focusing on 
providing resources by the CEO will be much lower. Therefore, the optimal board size for 
boards focusing on providing resources rather than monitoring may be somewhat larger.  
 
Proposition 4: The optimal board size is larger for boards prioritizing provision of resources 
than for boards prioritizing monitoring. 
 
INFLUENCE OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE POLICIES 
Codes of good governance have risen to prominence in the last decade as they have spread 
around the world (Aguilera and Cuervo-Cazurra, 2009). Codes of good governance have 
some key universal principles for effective corporate governance which are common to most 
countries. O’Shea (2005) shows that most codes have some recommendations on the 
following six governance practices explicitly or implicitly: (1) A balance of executive and 
non-executive directors, such as independent non-executive directors; (2) a clear division of 
responsibilities between the chairman and the chief executive officer; (3) the need for timely 
and quality information provided to the board; (4) formal and transparent procedures for the 
appointment of new directors; (5) balanced and understandable financial reporting; and (6) 
maintenance of a sound system of internal control.  
 
One mechanism to implement codes is through development of stringent corporate legislation. 
However, such a compulsory approach is rarely found in codes of good governance and is 
more commonly associated with laws and regulations. Voluntary firm compliance is the other 
mechanism used to implement the codes as it was originally done in the Cadbury Report. It is 
based on the rule of “comply or explain” where it is not required for listed companies to 
comply with the all code recommendations, but companies are required to state how they have 
applied the principles in the code and in the cases of noncompliance, they must explain the 
reasons. According to MacNeil and Li (2006), this approach has two underlying 18 
 
considerations: flexibility to adjust the characteristics of different firms and an assumption 
that the capital markets will monitor and assess value to compliance. Goncharov, Werner and 
Zimmermann (2006) show that there the degree of compliance with the code is the consistent 
value-relevant information for the capital market. Firms with higher compliance are priced at 
an average premium. This suggests that the capital markets accept the rules of the code to be 
meaningful and there is capital market pressure to adopt the code. Pressure to comply with 
corporate governance codes could have a moderating effect on the design of the board of 
directors. 
 
Proposition 5: Corporate governance policies and capital market pressure to comply with 
corporate governance policies may influence the board composition decisions. 
 
DISCUSSION AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS 
 
Our framework has highlighted the importance of different organizational environments on 
the board of directors. Much corporate governance research focuses on an Anglo-Saxon 
context, the results of which may be hard to generalize across different samples of firms or 
national systems. In addition, much of the policy prescriptions enshrined in codes of good 
corporate governance rely on universal notions of best practice, which often need to be 
adapted to the local contexts of firms or translated across diverse national institutional settings 
Aguilera and Cuervo-Cazurra 2004, Fiss and Zajac 2004). In this context, Aguilera (2005) 
and Millar et al. (2005) argue that national institutions such as the ownership structure, the 
enforceability of corporate regulations or culture tend to enable as well as constrain diverse 
corporate governance mechanisms and that a better understanding of the role of boards of 
directors in different institutional settings is needed before engaging in the debate of how to 
increase board accountability. An important questions addressed in this paper is whether all 
firms, regardless of their ownership pattern, should be submitted to the ‘one-rule-fits-all’ 
principle of majority non-executive directors, a separation of CEO and chairman and the 
optimal board size.  
 
Furthermore, much of the weight in solving the excess power within corporations has been 
assigned to the board of directors and, specifically, to the need for non-executive directors to 
increase executive accountability. The high expectations of the role of the non-executive 19 
 
board members are interesting since the existing empirical studies show mixed results 
regarding the relationship between firm performance and board independence. Hillman et al. 
(2000) discuss how in governance research there is a need to look at skills distinct from 
monitoring. They posit it is also important to have board members with varied skills such as 
being insiders in the firm, business experts, support specialists (e.g., experts on law or public 
relations) and community influentials (e.g., members of a community organization). 
Moreover, the resource dependence perspective presents an alternative to the agency 
perspective, arguing that good governance is achieved when board members are appointed for 
their expertise to help firms successfully cope with environmental uncertainty. 
 
Zahra and Pearce (1989) and Hillman and Dalziel (2003) describe the two main functions of 
the Board of Directors as monitoring and providing resources. In practice, boards both 
monitor and provide resources (Korn/Ferry, 1999), and, theoretically, both are related to firm 
performance. We argue that the priorities of the board of directors are not independent from 
the context in which the company operates. The monitoring role of outside directors is most 
important when ownership is diffuse: when ownership is concentrated, the large 
shareholder(s) can effectively influence and monitor the management, sometimes by 
personally sitting on the board. Shleifer and Vishny (1986) argue that large shareholders have 
a strong incentive to monitor managers because of their significant economic stakes. 
Furthermore, the composition and role of the board of directors can be influenced by large 
shareholders. Rather than using the board to add an additional layer of monitoring, a role as 
providing resource to management maybe much more useful to improve firm performance. 
Large shareholders in firms with concentrated ownership are individually motivated to 
monitor management, have a lot of influence beyond the board, access to valuable 
information and alternative corporate governance mechanisms to disciple the managers if 
necessary. Furthermore, if the controlling owners are also actively involved in the 
management of the company, the need to monitor by the controlling shareholder disappears. 
However, shareholders in firms with dispersed ownership have, collectively, a great need to 
use the board of directors to monitor the managers to resolve the alignment problem. 
 
We argue that the desired characteristics of the outside board members depend on the 
priorities set by the board of directors. Board primarily focusing on monitoring can benefit 
strongly from outsider board members who have expertise and experience at understanding 20 
 
financial reports, while boards focusing on providing resources may benefit from having 
politicians or lawyers on their boards. Additionally, corporate governance codes have strongly 
focused on board independence as key element of good governance. From an agency 
perspective, a duality of the chairman may substantially weaken the board’s monitoring 
effectiveness. However from a resource provision perspective, a duality may be beneficial. If 
the board of directors is designed to assist management, the presence of CEO on the board 
will be beneficial. Not only will its presence improve the information flow towards the board 
members, but the interaction and discussion of the CEO with board members may lead to 
more valuable advice and better firm performance. Furthermore, the problem of duality may 
be far less relevant when large shareholders provide counterbalance. An underperforming 
CEO, even if chairman, may face more initiative to substitute him by board members 
representing large shareholders than board members representing minority shareholders.  
 
Understanding the influence of the board of directors on firm performance requires greater 
sensitivity to how corporate governance affects different aspects of effectiveness for different 
stakeholders and in different contexts. We argue that theory and empirical research should 
progress to a more context dependent understanding of corporate governance and that this, in 
turn, will prove very useful for practitioners and policymakers interested in applying 
corporate governance in particular situations.  
 
The insight on the interaction between the ownership structure and board composition can 
shed new light onto the contradictory empirical results of past research that has tried to link 
board composition or structure to firm performance directly. For example, the question of 
whether CEO and chairman separation fosters firm performance or not has remained 
unanswered. A closer look at the interactions between the shareholders structure and the 
boards’ priorities may then help us to better understand why, in some instances, duality is 
associated with better firm performance, and in others it is not. The argument for a more 
contextualized approach to corporate governance has implications for public policy. In light 
of scandals and perceived advantages in reforming governance systems, debates have 
emerged over the appropriateness of implementing corporate governance recommendations 
mainly based on an Anglo-Saxon context characterized by dispersed ownership where 





This paper develops a theoretical model to better understand how the priorities of the board of 
directors are influenced by the ownership structure and how that affects firm performance. 
Most corporate governance research focuses on a universal link between corporate 
governance practices (e.g., board structure, shareholder activism) and performance outcomes, 
but neglects how the specific context of each company and diverse environments lead to 
variations in the effectiveness of different governance practices. Furthermore, the corporate 
governance reforms focus strongly on improving the monitoring ability of the board of 
directors. However, the resource dependence perspective (Pfeffer and Salancik 1978; Boyd 
1990) presents an alternative to the agency perspective, arguing that good governance is 
achieved when board members provide valuable resources to help firms successfully cope 
with environmental uncertainty rather than monitoring experience. This study suggest that the 
ownership structure has an important influence on the priorities set by the board, and that 
these priorities will determine the optimal composition of the board of directors. In contrast to 
a board prioritizing monitoring, where directors with financial experience and a duality are 
important, a board prioritizing the provision of resources could benefit from directors with 
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Table1: Ownership, Corporate governance problems and the priorities of the board 




1)  Important Management – Shareholders 
agency problem: individual shareholders are 
concerned that management pursues its own 
utility maximization at the stake of firm value, 
but each Shareholder lacks incentive to 
monitor individually (free-riding problem) 
Board of Directors: main task is to monitor 
management and align management actions 
with shareholders’ interests.  
Alternatively: Market for managers, Take-
over threat 
¾  Monitoring priority of the board: very 
high 
¾  Provision of Resources: moderate 
2)  Important Management – Shareholders 
agency problem: individual shareholders are 
concerned that management pursues its own 
utility maximization at the stake of firm 
value, but the problem is reduced by incentive 
alignment  
Board of Directors: main task is to monitor 
management and align management actions 
with shareholders’ interests.  
Alternatively: Market for managers, Take-
over threat 
¾  Monitoring priority of the board: high 




3)  Lesser management – shareholder agency 
problem: Large shareholder(s) provide 
monitoring of management, and the presence 
of outside shareholders reduces the risk of 
wealth expropriation from minority 
shareholders. 
Board of Directors: reflects to a large extend 
the ownerships structure and since large 
shareholders already monitor management, 
providing useful resources to management 
rather than focusing extensively on 
monitoring may be a more valuable option.  
Alternatively: the presence of other block 
holders could limit minority expropriation 
behavior 
¾  Monitoring priority of the board: low 
¾  Provision of Resources: high 
4)  No management – shareholder agency 
problem, but risk of wealth expropriation 
from minority shareholders (e.g.Family 
controlled firms ) 
Board of Directors: reflects to a large extend 
the ownerships structure and since large 
shareholders are also managers, providing 
useful resources to management may be a 
more valuable option.  
Alternatively: the presence of other block 
holders could limit minority expropriation 
behavior 
¾  Monitoring priority of the board: very 
low 











 Figure 1: relationship between ownership structure, composition of the board and firm 
performance 
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